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A Superannuation Fund as a Buyer? 
 
 
In Bennett v Stewart1 McMurdo J considered the operation of a contract where the 
buyer was described as a superannuation fund. 
 
The Bennetts signed a standard REIQ contract as buyers of the Stewarts’ house and 
land.  However, the reference schedule to the contract document contained these 
words next to the word ‘buyer’: 
 
 ‘Bennett Superannuation Fund’ 
 
The Bennetts wished to enforce the contract. 
 
In response, the Stewarts (the sellers) raised two issues: 
 
 As the ‘Bennett Superannuation Fund’ was a trust and not a distinct legal 
entity capable of making a contract, the contract did not specify who was the 
buyer, so that the contract was void for uncertainty; and 
 The contract was unenforceable as there was no sufficient note or 
memorandum for the purposes of s 59 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) as 
s 59 requires, amongst other things, an identification of the parties. 
 
McMurdo J did not accept either of these arguments and made an order for specific 
performance in favour of the Bennetts.  Looking at each issue separately: 
 
Uncertainty 
 
McMurdo J opined that the document as a whole must be considered, and within 
proper bounds, some interpretation must be sought to give the document the legal 
effect which it clearly was intended to have.  In this regard, the signature of the 
Bennetts above the word ‘buyer’ provided a strong indication that the Bennetts were 
indeed the buyers.  This was considered consistent with the reference to the 
Superannuation Fund in the schedule in that any acquisition of what would be an 
asset of the trust would be made by the Fund’s trustees.  McMurdo J opined: 
 
 ‘It is the fact that plainly the specified buyer in the schedule is not a distinct legal entity, but is 
a reference to a trust relationship, which indicates that when the Bennetts signed as the 
buyers, that is what they were.’2 
 
McMurdo J also accepted that there could be another rational explanation for the 
Bennett’s signatures i.e. they were signing the contract as trustees of the 
Superannuation fund.  On this alternative view, the contract was still considered to 
be sufficiently certain as the case law made it clear that for the purpose of 
contractual certainty, a party although unnamed, may be sufficiently described in 
other ways.  Accordingly, if the document was to be interpreted as a contract made 
by the trustees of the fund, extrinsic evidence could be received to identify the 
                                                 
1 [2008] QSC 20. 
2 Bennett v Stewart [2008] QSC 20, [7]. 
relevant trustees.  In this case, there was unchallenged evidence that the Bennetts 
were and remained the trustees of the specified trust. 
 
Section 59 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) 
 
As was the case for the purpose of contractual certainty, to satisfy s 59 of the 
Property Law Act 1974 (Qld), McMurdo J held that a party, although unnamed, may 
be sufficiently described in other ways.  Accordingly, the Bennetts as trustees were 
sufficiently identified by the contract for the purposes of s 59. 
 
For the Stewarts it was argued that the contract did not describe a person or entity 
which could, with evidence, be identified; rather it described the buyer as something 
which had no legal existence for which therefore there could be no exercise of 
identification.  This argument was not accepted by McMurdo J on the basis that the 
submission only looked to the one line in the reference schedule and did not 
consider the effect of the other parts of the contract.  Nor was it considered to be an 
argument which sought to find some rational interpretation which would give the 
document the legal force which those signing it meant it to have. 
 
Comment 
 
Although some practitioners may be surprised by the result in this instance, the 
reasoning may be seen to be consistent with a substantial body of earlier case law.  
When it comes to the interpretation of a contract, courts will do their utmost to find a 
find a rational interpretation which will give the contract certainty when it is clear that 
the parties intended the document to have contractual effect. 
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